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Abstract 
The history behind the award of Brisbane City Council’s Legacy Way project is discussed. 
The discussion focus on the possible impact of cognitive bias in the Expression of Interest  
(EOI) process together with the steps that were taken during the EOI development and 
evaluation phase to reduce the impact that this may have had on the selection of 
Contractors from their EOI submissions.  The paper concludes that Cognitive Bias may have 
created a greater barrier to entry to Contractors attempting to enter the Australian PPP 
market than has been previously realised and makes suggestions as to how this effect could 
be minimised in the future. 
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Introduction 
Australian Government agencies and their state and local counterparts have been courting 
international construction companies for several years. The government has stated its desire 
to improve the efficiency of major infrastructure procurement (particularly PPPs) for the sake 
of securing the best possible value for money. To international contractors seeking to deploy 
highly skilled, highly experienced resources in new jurisdictions the government’s intent is 
attractive, and with such capable resources on the prowl it’s no wonder the Australian 
Government continues to entice.   
 
Despite continued effort of both the Australian government and international contractors, 
very few projects in the civil infrastructure domain have been awarded to (or won by) 
international contractors. There have been numerous discussions and reports conducted 
with key stakeholders in an attempt to address this issue and unlock the potential of foreign 
involvement in major infrastructure projects. Interestingly, the conclusions from much of the 
discussion and debate have been remarkably similar. 
 
A recent KPMG report (KPMG 2010) on behalf of Infrastructure Australia (IA) provides a 
good summary and concludes that most Participants (both private and public sector) felt that 
there was good competition within the Australian market, however factors identified as 
deterrent for both Australian and international competitors were: 
 
 The unknown pipeline of projects and their sporadic nature 
 A perceived lack of commitment to PPPs across all jurisdictions in Australia 
 The size of the bid costs 
 
An interesting point of difference was that several international participants considered that 
the requirement to demonstrate local experience was also a barrier. However, this view was 
not shared by the Federal Government. 
 
These points are highly representative of the conclusions by many on both sides of the 
relationship and both sides of the debate. So, why do so few international contractors 
proceed beyond the Expressions of Interest (EOI) Stage? The answer may not lie in the 
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consistency of views proposed by various stakeholders but in the inconsistency of views 
between government and internationals regarding barriers to entry as outlined above. 
 
One project to successfully attract international contractors, see them progress through EOI 
and deliver compelling value for government was Legacy Way in Brisbane, Australia.  
However, the companies within the Joint Venture responsible for Legacy Way have been 
comparatively unsuccessful in proceeding beyond the EOI phase of subsequent projects. 
Given the significant similarities in size and complexity of Legacy Way and the projects being 
targeted by these contractors, this presents a confounding concern for government and 
international contractors. Has the courtship been a brief fling or is there potential for a 
fulfilling marriage?  
 
This paper uses the authors’ experience gained during the Legacy Way project as a case 
study and hypothesises why Legacy Way was effective in securing international contractors 
and perhaps why other contemporary projects may not be as successful - as this is clearly 
not the intent of the various public bodies involved in the letting of PPPs - the phrase 
‘inadvertent barriers to entry’ is coined. In so doing, the authors make the assessment that 
significant barriers to entry do exist in the Australian construction industry but are cautious to 
highlight that they may be the consequence of cognitive biases.  In the case of Legacy Way 
particular changes were made to the Expressions of Interest evaluation process and criteria 
to reduce the effect of any bias and it is the authors’ belief that if these changes had not 
been made the eventual winner would not have qualified past the EOI stage. 
 
The authors’ intent is to highlight the frame of mind adopted on Legacy Way, and the 
resultant actions undertaken in shaping the procurement process (particularly the EOI 
phase) and contrast them with operating philosophies and processes of conventional 
projects. The inference is that by repeating some of the behaviour adopted by the client on 
Legacy Way, it is possible that the procurement results may be replicated in part i.e. 
inclusion of international project teams beyond the EOI phase in a fair and transparent 
process. 
 
We pose practical solutions that government agencies may consider adopting when 
engaging international companies.  The initiatives span the full procurement cycle from initial 
market sounding through to interactive RFP processes. The aim of the paper is not to 
comment on the postulate that international competition is desirable and in the interests of 
the Australian public and taxpayer. 
 
Background 
Project Description 
Brisbane City Council has undertaken several major infrastructure projects since 2005. Two 
of these projects were constructed by ‘new’ international contractors and second tier 
contractors. The $300m Go Between Bridge was delivered under an Alliance between 
Brisbane City Council, Bouygues Traveaus Publics, Seymour Whyte and MacMahon and the 
$1.7bn Legacy Way is under construction by the Transcity Joint Venture (Acciona, Ghella, 
BMD). 
 
Brisbane City Council’s initiatives appear, on the surface, to be consistent with, and 
remarkably similar to, other government’s seeking international interest. However, their 
results provide compelling evidence to investigate a little deeper. 
 
Legacy Way is the fourth of five major projects that form Brisbane City Council’s TransApex 
programme. TransApex comprises: 
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 CLEM7 (formerly North South Bypass Tunnel) – currently in operation with RiverCity 
Motorway SPV as concessionaire 
 Airport Link – currently under construction with BrisConnections SPV as 
concessionaire 
 Go Between Bridge – currently in operation with Brisbane City Council as 
owner/operator 
 Legacy way (formerly Northern Link) – currently under construction with Brisbane 
City Council as owner/operator 
 East-West Link – currently forecast for delivery by 2026 
 
The Procurement Cycle 
The procurement of large infrastructure projects in Australia usually follows a six step 
process involving: 
 
1. Market Sounding 
2. Issue of Request for Expression of Interest (EOI) 
3. Short listing from the EOI’s received 
4. Issue of a Request for Proposal  (RFP) to the shortlisted EOI respondents 
5. Evaluation of RFP responses 
6. Negotiation leading to the award of contract 
 
This paper deals largely with steps 1-3 and is based on the experience developed by the 
Transaction Team during the procurement of Legacy Way (formally known as the Northern 
Link Project). 
 
Development of the Procurement Process 
The procurement phase for Legacy Way was conducted over 24 months from September 
2008 to September 2010. It followed a typical project lifecycle with prefeasibility in 2004, a 
preliminary assessment in 2007 and detailed feasibility in 2007-8. The procurement phase 
included a first phase of market sounding and EOI, a second phase of market sounding and 
EOI and the Request for Proposals phase. During the procurement phase the operating 
environment was particularly dynamic. An understanding of the macro environment, the 
industry dynamics and resources required/available was highly powerful for guiding the 
project through its development. 
 
The project was initially conceived as a PPP, but due to the Global Financial Crisis and the 
poor comparison of forecast traffic with actual traffic experienced on other similar projects it 
quickly became apparent that there was not sufficient interest in the market to enable a 
competitive PPP process to proceed. Council therefore decided to undertake international 
market sounding to reignite market appetite in the project.  
 
The feedback from the international companies canvassed in this campaign brought 
Council’s attention to the following: 
 
1. Large international companies were interested in the Australian market 
2. These companies were discouraged from proceeding with EOI’s due to a continued 
list of failures 
3. They regarded the Australian Market as “a closed shop” dominated by the Major 
Australian Construction Companies. They were particularly concerned about 
members of the same group being allowed to submit competing offers 
4. There appeared to be a lack of transparency in the evaluation process thus making 
the reason for failure hard to determine 
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5. These companies were successful both in their own countries and in a number of 
overseas countries and other than for point 3 were unable to explain their lack of 
success in the Australian market 
6. None of the companies visited had the appetite for taking greenfield traffic risk 
 
It soon became apparent that overseas companies whilst interested in the Project were not 
ready to commit the resources required to submit an EOI unless some or all of points 3, 4 
and 6 were adequately addressed.  
 
Demonstrating Intent 
Based on the above feedback Council was determined to demonstrate that Legacy Way 
would be different; principally that the Council project team had listened to concerns of the 
Internationals and that positive steps were taken to present Legacy Way as a new project 
and minimise the risk of another failed EOI. This point is critical.  Council was in a do or die 
situation.  Not all projects experience the heightened sensitivity to failure that focuses efforts 
on finding new solutions to old problems.  
 
This intent was predominantly demonstrated through visible changes to the EOI process and 
evaluation criteria that were difficult for many project team members and advisors to accept. 
 
Changes to Council EOI Evaluation Criteria 
The review resulted in the modifications to evaluation criteria as shown in table 1 below: 
 
Criteria Prior to 
Review 
Criteria Post Review Risks In New Criteria Mitigation Strategy 
Experience of the 
Brisbane Market 
Required 
 
Proven experience in 
working in an overseas 
market with a similar 
environment to Brisbane 
required and 
demonstration of 
capability to successfully 
complete projects in new 
jurisdictions 
Overseas proponents 
would not have 
experience of specific 
Australian requirement 
in terms of I.R., safety 
and environmental 
requirements 
Strongly encourage any 
overseas partner to obtain 
an Australian partner with 
good local knowledge  
 
Full Teams needed to 
be formed 
Full teams need not be 
formed at the EOI stage. 
Other members could be 
added during the RFP 
stage. 
Shortlisted proponents 
may not be able to form 
full bid teams in the 
required time frame and 
some key members of 
the team may not be 
acceptable to council. 
Identify key consortium 
members and require their 
identification at the EOI 
stage. Require 
unsuccessful EOI 
Respondents to release 
team members thus 
making them available for 
the RFP phase 
Evaluation criteria 
somewhat vague 
Dictionary type definitions 
used to define evaluation 
criteria requirements 
Difficulty in ensuring 
definitions were accurate 
Continue review by senior 
project staff 
Evaluation weighting 
not published 
Evaluation weighting 
published in the EOI 
request 
Resistance from team 
members used to 
subjective format 
Carry out in-house reviews 
and ensure weightings 
truly represented Councils 
concerns 
Lack of Understanding 
of EOI requirements 
Interactive EOI phase 
proposed to enable 
clarification from bidders 
Probity Concerns Plan briefings with probity 
auditor and of course have 
probity auditor present 
during briefings 
Table 1 Modifications to the EOI Criteria 
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Recognising Cognitive Biases of the Client 
Cognitive biases were first popularised by Kahneman and Tversky in the 70s (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1972, Tversky and Kahneman 1973, Kahneman and Tversky 1977). Since 
then, a growing list of cognitive biases has been developed by numerous researchers of 
decision making and theory in fields such as cognitive science, social psychology and 
behavioural economics (Gilovich, Griffin et al. 2002, Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Of 
particular interest in this case is the rational and irrational routes to status quo bias and the 
interplay between status quo bias, loss aversion and omission bias. 
 
Of critical importance in this discussion is the objective of the shortlisting process. At EOI 
stage, clients intend to decide, using incomplete information, which entities are most likely to 
provide the most compelling binding offer following the RFP phase. This establishes a 
decision making process that is complex with essentially incomplete information (committed 
bids are unknown) and thus introduces the need for ‘intuitive’ responses by advisors 
reporting on the submissions of each EOI respondent. 
 
It could be argued that a rational path to status quo bias exists – that is, it is ‘safer’ to select 
known choices (in this case contractors with reputable records in Australia with whom 
advisors are familiar) because local contractors generally deliver acceptable results.  
However, this line of interrogation leads to maintaining the status quo and in the case of 
Legacy Way would have risked a failed process. More broadly, adopting this view fails to 
deliver on the outcomes sought by Infrastructure Australia – i.e. removing barriers “that 
might reduce the competitiveness of the PPP procurement process such as to prevent 
Governments from achieving best value for money (even if they still achieve value for 
money in an absolute sense)” (KPMG 2010)  
 
Instead, irrational paths to status quo bias include loss aversion, and omission bias. We 
propose that when advisers are faced with making assessments about potential bidders they 
subconsciously emphasise the prospect of a loss (i.e. arriving at a decision that is unfamiliar, 
not the norm and results in a worse outcome than traditionally experienced). This results in 
assessments of potential bidders that would follow the function presented by Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Australian and/or familiar 
Contractors, sub-contractors and personnel would sit in the right hand upper quadrant and 
unfamiliar Contractors in the lower left. These weightings are unintentional and occur prior to 
any formal scoring of participants and are therefore unlikely to be observed in the majority of 
projects. 
 
Figure 1 Prospect Theory 
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Legacy Way was somewhat unique due to the environmental conditions of the time in that 
the prospect of a failed process was acting against the status quo (i.e. the prospect of a loss 
through inaction meant changing behaviour was positively valued).  Further, the project team 
was made up of individuals with less personal familiarity with local Contractors and through 
numerous market soundings became arguably equally familiar with international contractors 
thereby minimising (not eradicating) possible cognitive biases. 
 
The Evaluation Process 
A two stage evaluation process was developed: 
 
Stage 1 Compliance: Requiring that the required information had been adequately 
submitted: 
Stage 2 Comparative Assessment: In which those EOI’s passing stage 1 were scored 
against the evaluation criteria. 
 
Request for expression of interest were sent out in December 2009 and six responses, four 
of which were from overseers groups, were received in March 2010. 
 
The Result 
The RFP Process and Project Award 
RFP’s were issued to: 
 
 Transcity (a consortium of Aciona, Ghella and BMD) 
 Northern Direct (Bouygues and Laing O’Rourke) 
 LBRJV (a consortium consisting of Leightons, Baulderstone and Razel) 
 
After a detailed evaluation process the project was awarded to the TransCity joint venture for 
a bid price well below Brisbane City Council’s budget and substantially below alternatives 
proposed by Contractors more familiar with the Australian environment. Needless to say, 
speculation was rife in industry regarding the likely performance of TransCity and Council.  
The final outcome for the project financially and technically is of interest to many in the 
industry. 
 
Current status 
Two years into the construction of Legacy Way, publicly available information on financial 
and technical progress is relatively limited. Anecdotal evidence points to a sound relationship 
between government and Contractor with positive comments regarding stakeholder 
management. Technically, recent tunnelling rates have resulted in setting a world record for 
11m TBMs with 48m of advance in one week. 
 
Conclusion 
Using Legacy Way as a case study provides several insights: 
 
 Inadvertent barriers to entry may help to explain why international contractors 
systematically fail to pass EOIs 
 Demonstrably changing the EOI process to herald the intent of the client may assist 
in increasing international contractor appetite (eschewing status quo for the sake of 
building trust) 
 Maintaining internal focus on the objectives of EOI assessments, the relative 
incompleteness of information and hence complexity of the decision may highlight 
potential cognitive biases 
 Gaining equal exposure to potential international and local bidders and structuring a 
project team with broad international experience may balance the cognitive biases 
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 Environmental conditions may serve to exacerbate or counteract loss aversion of 
selecting unfamiliar contractors 
 The RFP stage is where a more complete picture of each bidder’s offer is presented 
but cognitive biases may still exist in complex decisions requiring subjective 
assessments 
 
Being aware of and taking steps to mitigate potential cognitive bias may hold the key to 
nuptial bliss between International Contractors and the Australian Government. In our 
ongoing commitment to achieving best value for money on major infrastructure projects, can 
we afford to maintain the status quo? 
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